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Understanding and accurately predicting attrition is vital to correctly managing 
the retention of naval aviators. This thesis investigates the ability of models 
incorporating a number of economic measures to predict naval aviator attrition 
rates. Using data from 1978 to 1990, this study examined a wide range of potential 
economic explanatory variables and their effects on naval aviator attrition rates. 
The naval aviator data set was grouped into six populations, separated by aviation 
community (helicopter, jet and propeller) and by years of service (5-8 and 9-12). 
Three separate linear regression models for each of the aviator groups were 
developed, and their predictive ability evaluated. The study found that: no single 
model was best at predicting attrition rates for all groups; simple models using one 
or two variables performed better than complex, multivariate models; the most 
useful predictor variable was the national unemployment rate; attrition rates with 
the highest levels and variability were in the jet and propeller pilot groups with five 
to eight years of service, and the most significant models, able to outperform a 
naive prediction, were found for these groups. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the recent era of military downsizing between the years of 1991 and 1995, 
naval aviator retention issues were not at the forefront. After all, this was a period which saw 
Involuntary Reduction in Active Duty (IRAD), Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI), Special 
Separation Bonus (SSB) and early retirement incentive programs used to reach new end- 
strength targets. However, the Navy is now approaching its new manning level targets, which 
means that managing the retention of qualified naval aviators will be more important than 
ever. With a smaller corps of pilots, the effects of large or unexpected fluctuations in 
retention (like those historically seen), may make the retention issue more challenging than 
ever before. 
The United States Navy invests a significant amount of time and money to train a 
naval aviator. In fact, at a marginal cost of between $250,000 and $750,000, it is among the 
most costly training provided by the Department of the Navy, representing one of the biggest 
investments in human capital. The average time to successfully train a new pilot, from flight 
school to fleet squadron, averages almost two years (depending on aircraft). Thus, the value 
of retention is both financial, in terms of return on investment, and logistic, in terms of 
managing a steady flow of talented pilots. While some attrition of Navy pilots is expected and 
desired to maintain the downstream billet structure, en masse, cyclic resignations in the past 
have led to severe pilot shortages. 
To help mitigate periods of unacceptable pilot attrition during the late 1970s and again 
in the late 1980s, the Navy employed Aviation Officer Continuation Pay (AOCP) and 
Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) respectively. These were bonus plans aimed at reducing 
the gap between downstream billet structure requirements and an established retention rate 
below that necessary to meet those requirements. The ACOL (Annualized Cost of Leaving) 
model was used to determine the marginal cost (bonus amount) per retention percentage 
increase required to meet pilot shortfalls in each mission community (Cymrot 1989). 
Unfortunately, gross shortages in certain year groups occurred before these programs were 
implemented, while surpluses in other year groups occurred in the early 1990s, when bonuses 
were still available. 
Timing is critical for these bonus plans and other retention tools to work efficiently. 
Insufficient lead time can result in reacting too late to retention crises. Additionally, crisis 
reactive personnel policies can lead to irregular promotion rates, inconsistent personnel policy 
and year-group shortages and surpluses, all of which have adverse effects on long term 
manpower planning. Correctly managing naval aviator retention is vital to ensuring a talented 
and motivated pilot base. With the proper tools and authority, pro-active personnel policies 
can lead to effective and efficient pilot retention management. This hinges on the ability to 
understand and accurately predict officer attrition with sufficient lead time to act. 
A.       BACKGROUND 
By far, the highest degree of voluntary separation is found between six and twelve 
years of service (YOS)1. This is perfectly understandable, given the context of a normal 
career progression. Following primary and advanced aviation training, prospective pilots are 
:The Aviation Career Improvement Act of 1989 extended minimum service requirements 
to seven years, (nine years for jet pilots). Its effects on retention are still to be seen starting in 
1996. 
designated as a naval aviator and incur a Minimum Service Requirement (MSR). Next comes 
Fleet Replenishment Squadron (FRS) training, where pilots learn to fly their assigned aircraft. 
During the first sea tour, the member increasingly gains knowledge and flight experience 
performing a mission specialty, and during the following shore tour, often serves as an 
instructor pilot. Typically, after completion of the shore tour, the aviator completes the MSR 
and the initial obligation to the Navy expires. It is between this point and the twelfth year of 
service that Navy pilots have the highest probability of resigning; when the naval aviator is 
young, skilled, employable, and not under a commitment or personally invested in a military 
retirement (Figure 1). Managing the retention behavior of pilots in this career stage is pivotal 
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Figure 1. Attrition Rates 1978-1990. (Source: Turner) 
Undoubtedly, an officer's decision to leave the Navy is a complex one, influenced by 
a wide variety of factors; demographic characteristics, family and marital status, economic 
opportunities and attitude towards a military lifestyle. But the list of factors greatly 
diminishes when we focus on the determinants of the vicissitudes in the attrition rates. For 
example, marital status and family separation may be major factors influencing attrition, but 
it is unlikely that they have fluctuated greatly and caused the wide fluctuations in attrition 
rates observed in Figure 2. On the other hand, economic conditions and civilian employment 
opportunities have fluctuated, indeed they are by nature cyclic. 
Aviator Attrition with YOS 5-8 
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Figure 2. Attrition Rates by Community. (Turner) 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine and evaluate observable, economic conditions 
which can explain or predict attrition behavior of naval aviators. To accomplish this, 
historical economic and retention data need to be analyzed to identify any trends and patterns 
that may exist. The literature documents fairly well a positive relationship between Navy pilot 
attrition and the state of the economy.   Economic indicators, airline hiring, and general 
employment opportunities often change in consort, and consequently impact retention. 
This study attempts to develop a model using regression analyses that will accurately 
predict Navy pilot attrition in a manner timely enough to use policy tools effectively. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary research question: 
Can a model be built, using economic indicators and other information available to 
planners, to accurately predict naval aviator attrition.? 
2. Secondary research question: 
What effects do various economic measures have on naval aviator attrition rates? 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This thesis will examine attrition behavior of naval aviators in each community during 
the period between 1978 and 1990. This time period was deliberately selected for several 
reasons. Examining determinants after 1990 may not be representative of normal attrition 
behavior, given the post-cold-war drawdown environment and subsequent force reduction 
policies. Data examined prior to 1978 might be skewed by Vietnam war era issues. This 
period (post Vietnam through the Reagan build up years) also saw a steady improvement in 
the status of a military career in terms of prestige, career optimism and pay, while the 
economy and airline industry experienced the extremes of a full business cycle: the recession 
of the early 1980's and the boom of the later 1980's. 
This study focuses on economic environmental factors external to the Navy, and 
examines their effects on attrition rates. This is a macro view of the attrition equation. The 
focus of this study is not to determine all factors which correlate with retention, or to 
necessarily explain why individuals stay or leave the Navy. To hold constant for individual 
factors, this study assumes that when pilot inventories are aggregated, individual factors 
average out, effectively making the populations relatively homogenous in their predisposed 
behavior. 
All three aviation communities, helicopter, propeller and jet, will be examined in this 
study. However, the focus group will be those aviators past their MSR and between five and 
twelve years of service.  This is where the bulk of both attrition and ambiguity exist, and 
where a predictive instrument can have the most value. 
E.        ORGANIZATION 
Following this introduction, Chapter II reviews previous research relevant to pilot 
attrition issues. Chapter m introduces the methodology and discusses the process of variable 
development. Data analysis, statistical results, model specification and model validation are 
presented in Chapter IV. Finally, Chapter V concludes with the findings of this study and 
makes recommendations for future research. 
H. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Several studies, from several different perspectives, have looked at the complex issues 
of Navy pilot retention. Some affirm a connection between external economic environmental 
factors and Navy pilot attrition, while others offer analytical techniques and motivating 
factors. 
A.        ATTRITION MOTIVATORS 
1. R Gordon Lawry n, "A Statistical Analysis of the Effects of Flight Time 
on Naval Aviator Retention", Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
September 1993 
In his study, Lawry posed the following research questions: 
Is there a quantifiable and statistically significant relationship between aviator 
flight-time and first-tour retention? 
What is the magnitude of the effect, if any? 
Does the existence and magnitude of this relationship differ among aviation 
communities? 
Here he examined the relationship between the number of flight hours flown by naval aviators 
and the possible effects on their decision to continue in the Navy, following the expiration of 
their first service obligation. 
Flight hour data and demographic data came from the Naval Safety Center (linked by 
social security numbers) and Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) Officer Master File 
and Loss files, respectively. Additional data included airline industry wage and hiring data 
obtained from Future Airline Professionals of America (FAPA) and unemployment data from 
the U.S. Commerce Department's Bureau of Labor and Statistics. 
The hypothesized results were based on the premise that the total utility retention 
function must also incorporate personal, non-pecuniary factors such as an aviator's joy of 
flying. Thus, higher retention behavior was expected for aviators whose personal experience 
included relatively higher flight-time. 
In separate binomial logit multivariate models for each aviation community (jet, 
propeller and helicopter), the dependent variable was set as a probability of retention. The 
independent variables included individual's flight-time, marital status, number of children, 
race, starting airline salary and number of pilots hired by major airlines. 
The study concluded that the flight-time variable was significant in propeller and jet 
communities only, but contrary to expectation in that higher flight-time led to higher attrition 
(reduced retention). Other variables determined to have significance were: 
• airline pilot hiring which had a negative effect on retention for all three 
communities. 
• civilian pay (airline salary) which proved to have a negative effect on retention in 
all three aviation communities. 
• marital status which showed a positive relationship between being married and 
retention. 
• child dependents which indicated that pilots with children were more likely to 
separate from the navy. 
• race which indicated that non-whites were more likely to remain in the military. 
Although the study effectively dismissed the perception that increased retention could 
be found by increasing flight-time, it provided important confirmation to manpower planners 
of the connection between basic economic factors and retention. 
2. David A. Kriegel, "An Examination and Comparison of Airline and 
Navy Pilot Career Earnings", Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 
1986 
This thesis compared lifetime incomes of Navy and major airline pilots. The author 
used regression analysis of actual 1983 pilot wages to predict average wages as a function of 
pilot seniority. The analysis adjusted for future wage changes and used them to forecast 
thirty-year pilot earnings in two distinct career paths. One path assumption was that the pilot 
remains in the Navy, retires at age forty-two, then flies for an airline, retiring at age sixty. 
The alternative path assumption has the pilot flying for an airline immediately following MSR 
and retiring at age sixty. The average military benefit of tax-free income and allowances were 
computed. Three Navy salaries were compared against weighted-average airline salary. 
Comparisons were made of earnings and retirement benefits, using a discount rate of five 
percent. 
The findings indicated that a Navy pilot will maximize his income by remaining in the 
military until retirement, and then flying with an airline. The author determined that (with the 
then-recent increases in pay, bonuses and benefits) the present value of Navy pay exceeded 
airline earnings by three to six percent. The study also noted a trend of decreasing benefits 
for airline pilots in the wake of industry deregulation and predicted that if airline wages 
continue to decrease, while Navy pay remains constant or increases, the comparison will shift 
further towards a Navy career. 
This study was extremely thorough in capturing all pecuniary variables in both Navy 
and airline compensation. One fundamental weakness in the study was in the validity of the 
premise of the alternative career path. The probability of successfully retiring from the Navy 
and then flying for an airline at age forty-two is exceptionally low, according to the study's 
own data. Age of hire data indicated an extremely low probability of hire for a pilot of 
retirement age. Also, age forty-two would be the minimum age of most retirees with many 
pilots retiring at older ages, making the probability of this alternative even more remote. This 
reality redefines the MSR stay/leave decision from a sophisticated present value model of 
future career earnings, to a personal overall career decision of either joining the airlines when 
the opportunity presents itself, or serving out a military career and then doing something else 
(other than flying for the airlines). 
Another consideration is the assumption that the naval aviator continues to promote, 
which is required to reach the rank of Commander (0-5) and to be eligible for twenty-year 
retirement. In fact, approximately forty percent of Lieutenant Commanders (0-4) may fail 
to promote (depending upon the promotion rate approved by Congress). 
Among the recommendations given in this study was one to educate aviators about 
the "true" future value of their career earnings as a way of improving retention. But retention 
data shows that despite a steady annual increase of approximately 2.5 percent in pay and 
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allowances from 1984 to 1988, the pilot attrition rate in the jet and prop communities (YOS 
5 to 8) rose from 7 to 34 percent and from 11 to 38 percent respectively. 
B.       ECONOMICS AND PILOT ATTRITION 
1. Samuel D Kleinman and CDR Charles Zuhoski, "Navy Pilot Attrition: 
Determinants and Economic Remedies", Center for Naval Analyses, 
February 1980 
In 1978, the Navy's Bureau of Personnel requested the Center for Naval Analyses 
(CNA) conduct a study to determine the effects and costs of an aviation bonus. CNA 
broadened the study to examine the effects and costs of Aviation Continuation Incentive Pay 
(ACIP) and to research other factors that may affect pilot retention. The study examined the 
effect of compensation on pilot attrition for the period FY 1963 to FY 1978. Officers 
commissioned from the United States Naval Academy, Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps 
(ROTC), and Aviation Officer Candidate School (AOCS), who completed their initial 
obligation, were examined separately in the analysis. 
The regression analyses set attrition rates fromFY 1963 to FY 1978 as the dependent 
variables. Two attrition rates were computed for each year-source-tenure class. The first was 
the unconditional attrition rate, where the initial accession class is the base; the second is the 
conditional attrition rate, where the number of officers at the beginning of the year is the base. 
The number leaving the pilot designation during the year was in the numerator in each case. 
Problems were encountered obtaining continuation rates for some years in certain sub-groups. 
Attrition rates were lagged six months from the calendar year's employment variables to 
account for the military's six month notification requirement. 
11 
Explanatory variables included changes in airline employment, military pay, airline pay, 
change in navy requirements, casualty rates and flight hours. Airline employment was 
estimated by converting airline industry hiring from Employment and Earnings reports from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, by assuming pilots account for ten percent of new hires. 
Airline wages were determined statistically using benchmark salaries obtained from Airline 
Professional of America (ALP A). 
The focus of the study was not to predict retention, but to determine elasticities of 
retention rates with respect to pay to help make informed policy decisions. A logit function 
was specified and appropriately weighted to remove heteroscedasticity, and zero values were 
set equal to .001. 
The authors noted that Vietnam casualty rates rose and declined at the same time as 
changes in airline employment, making it difficult to identify the individual effects of each on 
retention. 
Among the principal findings of the study: 
• Pilot retention decreased when commercial airline employment increased. 
• Among Naval Aviators just completing their minimum service requirement (MSR), 
retention was directly related to the differences between military and commercial 
pilot salaries. 
• Changes in the Navy's requirements for pilots (demand in itself) had little influence 
on the attrition of pilots in the period examined. 
• The casualty rate during the Vietnam war had a negative effect on the retention 
rate of Navy pilots. 
12 
The number of pilot flight hours flown in the Navy was unrelated to the retention 
of pilots in the period examined. 
Overall economic opportunities in the civilian sector, as measured by changes in 
employment in the private sector and in the median income of male college 
graduates, were not related to the retention of pilots over the sample period. 
The study also examined the effects of alternative pay incentives. They concluded that 
a bonus award vice an increase in ACIP would be more cost effective. 
2.        Donald J. Cymrot, "Implementation of the Aviation Continuation Pay 
(ACP) Program", Center for Naval Analyses, April 1989. 
This research was conducted to support the Navy in designing an implementation plan 
for the Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) program. The ACP program addressed the critical 
shortages seen when too many aviators left the Navy between the time they completed their 
active duty service obligation and the time they serve in more senior, department head billets 
(at about eleven years of service). 
The approach CNA used to measure the differences in military and civilian 
employment utility was the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model. The theory behind 
this model is that an individual will decide on staying in the military or leaving for civilian 
employment based on perceived future costs and benefits of each alternative. For aviator 
retention analysis, the model was defined by three main factors (with airline industry data used 
as proxy for competing civilian employment): 
Relative pay; the differences between the present value of the actual and projected 
civilian (airline) and military pay. 
Civilian employment demand; the hiring rates of the major airlines. 
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• Unemployment rates; the condition of the job market. 
Previous continuation rates for specific aircraft communities were used as baseline figures. 
Military pay tables were used to derive military pilot projected pay through the twentieth year 
of service. The equivalent civilian pilot pay used was average annual pilot pay, determined 
from survey data obtained from the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA), a pilots' labor union 
representing several airlines. An earnings equation was estimated, using weighted least 
squares, and a predicted earnings profile was developed. 
The findings from the study primarily included the responsiveness of retention to pay, 
for various groups of aviators. This ultimately led to a policy of varying amounts of bonus 
pay, determined by the required retention and the responsiveness of that community to 
monetary incentives. Interestingly, the magnitude of the effects of the explanatory variables 
was small. Relative pay was found to be a very significant factor for helicopter pilots (who 
generally do not find employment in airlines) while propeller and jet pilots' reaction to relative 
pay were insignificant. Civilian airline hiring affected retention in all communities; most 
significantly in propeller pilots and least significantly in helicopter pilots. Unemployment was 
a significant factor in all aviation communities. Helicopter pilots were the most sensitive with 
propeller and jet pilots less so. 
The focus of the study was more towards cost and effectiveness of a proposed ACP 
program, and less on explaining or predicting retention. It effectively tried to predict the 
amount of money required to increase the probability of retention in a population of 
14 
undecided aviators. 
Certainly, narrowing the gap between military pay and airline pay (using a bonus) is 
an effective retention tool. The finding that pilot attrition is sensitive to changes in the airline- 
military pay gap may be worthy of further study. Navy pilots must submit resignation 
requests to document their availability before they even apply for an airline position. There 
is tremendous uncertainty in the selection process employed by major airlines, which usually 
leads pilots to accept the first position available and subsequently stay with that carrier. When 
these structural considerations are coupled with the fact that there is significant disparity in 
the salary schedules from carrier to carrier2, it seems questionable that changes in attrition 
rates are influenced by changes in the difference between airline pay and military pay, both 
of which change incrementally at best. A simpler explanation may be that airline pilots are 
well-paid, and that any effort to improve military compensation will reduce attrition. 
C.        DETERMINING RETENTION RATES 
1. Donald   J.   Cymrot,   Patricia   E.   Byrnes,   Joseph   T.    Schertler, 
"Determining Continuation Rates for Pilots from the Officer Master 
File", Center for Naval Analyses, June 1988. 
The Officer Master File (OMF) is the primary source used to measure continuation 
rates of officers in the Navy. This research examined how the definition of the continuation 
rate for Naval officers is implemented using data for the OMF.   Continuation rates are 
measured for a cohort of officers defined by their qualifications and year group.   Several 
2
 In 1995, sixth-year monthly pay at United Airlines and America West Airlines was 
$89,300 and $50,486, respectively. (Compass. Future Airline Professionals Association, 1995) 
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conceptual and data problems were addressed in defining "continuation rate" and various 
inflows and outflows for specific cohorts. 
The continuation rate for a cohort of pilots is defined as the number of pilots in the 
cohort at the beginning of a period divided by the number of officers in that cohort at the end 





where Nis the starting inventory and At is the number officers on active duty at time /. The 
difference between^ and N'\s supposed to be attributed to attrition. The two major sources 
of attrition for pilots are lateral transfers (officers who change to non-pilot designators) and 
officers who leave the navy. The paper also points out problems with tracking outflows and 
inflows which it characterizes as "turbulence". Elements which contribute to this turbulence 
are Year group ins (entry into the year group from another), lateral ins (transfer of a non- 
aviator to an aviator designator), accessions (those new to active duty), Year group outs and 
lateral outs. 
The analysis revealed that turbulence can cause attrition to be overstated when it is 
based on gross continuation rates (GCR) obtained by matching beginning and ending 
inventories, because of excluded inflows. The authors conclude that, when continuation is 
used as an indicator of total inventory, inflows should be included. Thus, net continuation 
rates (NCR), obtained by comparing the beginning inventory of one year to the beginning 
inventory of the next, is a more accurate measure of continuation.  However, when the 
16 
continuation rate is needed to measure the response of attrition to policy changes, tracking 
initial inventories is a better measure of continuation. 
2. Russell S. Turner, "The Impact of the Military Drawdown on USN 
Aviator Retention Rates", Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March, 
1995. 
The objective of this study was two fold; to construct a unique analytical data base 
containing calculated continuation rates of Naval Flight Officers (NFO) and Naval aviators 
in each community (propeller, helicopter and jet), then to examine the effects of several 
military policies on retention of these Naval officers. 
This thesis used grouped data defined by year of commission, fiscal year, and aviator 
type. The analysis quantified the relationship between various downsizing policies and cohort 
continuation rates while controlling for the effects of time-since-MSR and civilian 
unemployment. 
a. Creating the retention database 
The database was created from the Officer Master File (OMF) maintained by 
the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). Fields used for filtering records included 
commissioning date, officer designator, loss code, additional qualifying designators (AQDs) 
and minimum service requirement (MSR). These filters ensured that only aviators and flight 
officers who were eligible to resign voluntarily were extracted from the data history tapes. 
Separate files were created for each of fifteen different fiscal years from 1977 to 1993 which 
contained Naval aviators from year groups 1960 through 1993. Cohort continuation rates 
were calculated by taking the cohort ending inventory and dividing it by the cohort beginning 
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inventory. Continuation rates were calculated for each fiscal year by year group and 
community. 
b.        Regression results 
The continuation rates were set as the dependent variable for separate ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression models for each community. The following explanatory 
variables yielded the following effects: 
• Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP), was statistically significant and showed a direct 
relationship between the bonus availability and retention with all models, with the 
exception of jet pilots. 
• Voluntary Separation Incentive/Special Separation Bonus programs (VSI/SSB), 
proved to be statistically insignificant. 
• Involuntary Reduction in Active Duty Policy (TRAD) was not statistically 
significant in any model. 
• MSR2 (Having time in service between MSR and MSR+2 years) was significant 
for jet and prop pilots only. This indicated a significant difference in retention 
behavior between these two groups and all others in that they are less likely to let 
the "stay" decision at MSR affect a subsequent decision after MSR. 
• MSR3 (Being in a career point between MSR+3 and MSR+5 (which equates to 
approximately 9 to 11 years of service)) was a significant factor for all groups 
indicating that as time increases beyond MSR+2, continuation rates increase. 
• UNEMP (Civilian Unemployment) was found to be significant only in the propeller 
pilot model. Turner speculated that higher unemployment was coincidental with 
lower airline hiring, which may have been a determinant for a corresponding lower 
propeller pilot retention. 
This analysis identified the statistical relationships between the various force structure 
policies and the underlying voluntary survival rate of Naval aviators. Of particular value to 
18 
this thesis is the base of retention data Turner constructed. His retention data will provide 
the basis for the dependent variables in upcoming analyses. 
D.       SUMMARY 
The literature makes a case for looking to economic opportunity indicators to predict 
changes in attrition rates. Several multiple regression approaches have been used to analyze 
the career decision determinants of Naval aviators. The studies by both Lawry and Kleinman 
examined individual attrition behavior using logistic regression models, and found the most 
significant explanatory variables to be those associated with opportunities for employment and 
other economic factors. 
The studies by Cymrot and Turner suggest methodologies for determining attrition 
rates and using grouped data and linear multivariate regression to analyze attrition behavior, 
respectively. 
This study borrows elements from each of these studies to try to explain and predict 
attrition in the form of a useful and practical tool for decision makers. The next chapter 




An underlying assumption in this study is that attrition decisions are a function of two 
sets of factors: 
• intrinsic, personal/individual factors such as job satisfaction, race, marital status, 
children, experiences, aversion to risk, value system etc., and 
• extrinsic, environmental factors such as employment opportunity, potential 
earnings, state of the economy indicators and the political climate. 
The former factors are important in that they establish a baseline of probabilities of attrition 
for the population of Naval aviators after MOS. The probability of attrition for this 
population is theorized to follow a logistic distribution along a symmetrical curve with 
diminishing probability densities at the tails. (Cymrot, 1989) This shape suggests that at the 
tails, members are committed to either resigning or staying in the Navy, while the center 
contains the undecided aviators who by default remain in the Navy unless (or until) they 
decide to resign. A hypothesis of this study is that, holding constant major changes in the 
political climate (not at war, for example), the undecided population is substantially influenced 
by factors which essentially reflect economic opportunity. 
The central objective of this study was to develop a model useful for predicting Navy 
pilot attrition. To accomplish this objective, the methodology followed these basic steps: 
• Gather a wide variety of potential explanatory variables. 
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• Correlate these variables individually with grouped cohort Naval aviator attrition 
rates, using a Pearson Correlation, to identify candidate variables for a multivariate 
regression model. 
• Build multivariate regression models for each aviator group. 
• Test the predictive value of the models using holdout data. 
The remainder of this chapter will cover techniques used for collecting data, selecting 
variables, structuring the relationships and analyzing variable characteristics. 
A.       DATA COLLECTION 
1.        Attrition Data and Measures 
Prior research has focused primarily on measuring the attrition behavior responses of 
individuals to certain characteristics or environments. This study uses aggregated data from 
a database created as a major thesis component (Turner, 1995). The database was created 
from the Officer Master File (OMF) maintained by the Defense Manpower Data Center 
(DMDC). Pilots under an obligation such as ACP or MOS, as well as involuntarily separated 
pilots, were eliminated from the data set. Cohort continuation rates of each year group and 
aviation community were obtained for fiscal years 1978 through 1990 from the database, and 
subsequently transformed into attrition rates for consistency in terminology. This was done 
by computing the complement of the continuation rates (1 - CR). Year groups were 
converted to relative years of service in each fiscal year. This attrition data is presented in the 
Appendix. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the population of pilots under study includes those 
aviators between the end of their MOS and twelve years of service. An initial examination 
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of the attrition behavior in all communities revealed distinct differences between the early 
YOS and later YOS aviators. First, Figure 3 illustrates how significant the average attrition 
rate levels of each aviation community were in YOS 5 to 8, compared to the attrition rates 
(including YOS 9 to 12) of other years in a career. As can be seen, attrition starts growing 
in year 5 and is at its maximum level in years 6 through 8. Attrition drops noticeably in year 
9, and rates in the 9 to 12 YOS period are well below those in the preceding periods. 
Average Attrition Percentage by 
Community and YOS 1978-1990 
5        6        7        8        9       10      11      12 
Years of Service 
Figure 3. Average Attrition Rates by YOS. 
Second, Figure 4 shows how significantly higher the variation in average attrition 
rates are for YOS 5 to 8 aviators, compared to those of aviators with YOS 9 to 12. 
23 
Standard Deviation of Attrition (%) by 
Community and YOS 1978-1990 
5       6       7       8      9      10     11     12 
Years of Service 
Figure 4. Standard Deviation of Attrition by 
YOS. 
Given the distinctively different behavior of the attrition data, the populations of each 
community were grouped separately into two categories; one with five to eight years of 
service (YOS 5-8) and another with nine to twelve Years of Service (YOS 9-12). Separate 
attrition rates were calculated for each community subgroup. 
The set of selected dependent variables were labeled as follows: 
PROP(5-8). Propeller community attrition rate for pilots with between five and 
eight YOS. 
PROP(9-12). Propeller community attrition rate for pilots with between eight and 
twelve YOS. 
HELO(5-8). Helicopter community attrition rate for pilots with between five and 
eight YOS. 
HELO(9-12). Helicopter community attrition rate for pilots with between eight 
and twelve YOS. 
JET(5-8). Jet community attrition rate for pilots with between five and eight YOS. 
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JET(9-12) Jet community attrition rate for pilots with between eight and twelve 
YOS. 
2.        Explanatory Data and Measures 
A wide variety of economic variables were initially considered for explaining changes 
in Naval aviator attrition. The literature suggested a variety of indicators including national 
unemployment rate and airline industry hiring rates as major factors. Other factors were 
considered. For example, perhaps the perception that economic conditions were changing 
(capturing trend) might be just as important as the actual level of unemployment or hiring 
rates. 
One of the requirements this study placed in considering potential independent 
variables was that the explanatory variables be based on data readily available to decision 
makers. All variable data, therefore, came directly from published statistics or were 
mathematically derived from them. This does not presume that aviators actually track chosen 
economic indicators, from the Wall Street Journal for example, but that perhaps these 
indicators capture the prevailing perception by aviators of the future of the economy or 
civilian employment market, regardless of what information they actually assimilate into their 
stay/quit decision. 
There were four basic variables to consider: a measure of unemployment, a measure 
of the economy as a whole, a measure of airline employment prospects and a measure of pay. 
For each basic variable (except for pay, due to its incremental nature), two kinds of measures 
were calculated: the numerical level for a given year, and an indication of its change or trend. 
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The change in a variable was measured by subtracting the previous year's level from the 
current year's level. 
For measures of unemployment, this study looked at the national unemployment rate. 
But understanding that the target group (college educated Naval aviators) would most likely 
be looking for management, engineering or some other professional trade, 'Professional 
Unemployment' rates were also examined. 
For measures of the economy as a whole, this study examined the Composite Index 
of Leading Economic Indicators, which includes twelve separate economic measures such as 
factory orders, inventories and interest rates, intended to anticipate near-future economic 
activity. 
For measures of airline employment prospects, this study examined numbers of pilots 
hired by major domestic carriers. 
For measures of pay, this study examined the ratio between military pay and airline 
pay. Military pay values were obtained from military pay scales for Naval aviators at the rank 
of 0-3, over eight years of service and include flight pay, basic allowance for quarters (BAQ) 
and basic allowance for subsistence (BAS). These were compared to airline compensation 
survey statistics conducted by the Bureau of Labor and Statistics in 1975, 1980, 1984 and 
1989. A weighted average salary was computed for each survey year, and interpolated values 
were inserted in the adjoining years. 
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The selection bases above led to an initial list of potential explanatory variables. 
Variable labels and their hypothesized effects on attrition are listed below: 
UNEMP. National Unemployment rate (t0)3, measured in terms of percent of 
unemployment. The study hypothesized this variable to negatively affect attrition 
rates, based on the expectation that as job opportunities diminish, fear of the job 
market would cause attrition rates to diminish. 
dUNEMP. Change in National Unemployment, measured in terms of percent 
change in unemployment or UNEMP^-tj). The study hypothesized this variable 
to negatively affect attrition rates, based on the expectation that if unemployment 
was increasing over the period, fear of a continuation of the trend would cause 
attrition rates to diminish. 
PR\UN. Professional ("white collar") Unemployment rate1, measured in terms of 
percent of unemployment among professionals. The study hypothesized this 
variable to negatively affect attrition rates, based on the expectation that as 
professional job opportunities diminish, fear of the job market would cause 
attrition rates to diminish. 
dPRYUN. Change in Professional Unemployment, measured in terms of percent 
change in professional unemployment or PR\UN(t0-t_i). The study hypothesized 
this variable to negatively affect attrition rates, based on the expectation that if 
professional unemployment was increasing over the period, fear of a continuation 
of the trend would cause attrition rates to diminish. 
CILEI. Composite Index of (twelve) Leading Economic Indicators year average4, 
measured on its own point scale. The study hypothesized this variable to positively 
affect attrition rates, based on the expectation that positive economic forecasts 
would be a comforting signal for life in the civilian sector, and lead to an increase 
in attrition rates. 
department of Labor, Bureau of Labor and Statistics, Employment and Earnings, 1976- 
1992. 
4
 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1988-1992, Business 
Conditions Digest. 1978-1987. 
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• dCILEI Change in Composite Index of (twelve) Leading Economic Indicators, 
measured in terms of change in points or CI(t0 - t.x). The study hypothesized this 
variable to positively affect attrition rates, based on the expectation that if the 
index was increasing over the period, a continuation of the trend would be 
expected, leading to optimism about the civilian sector economy and a subsequent 
increase in attrition rates. 
• HIRES. Airline Hires5, measured in terms of number of pilots hired by major 
domestic carriers. The study hypothesized that major domestic carriers 
represented the most significant competing industry for pilots and had a positive 
effect on attrition, based on the expectation that if airlines were actively hiring, 
pilots would have a higher probability of getting hired and pilot attrition rates 
would increase. 
• dHIRES. Change in Airline Hires, measured in terms of difference in the number 
of pilots hired or HERES(t0- t.j). The study hypothesized this variable to positively 
affect attrition rates, based on the expectation that with a trend of increasing airline 
hiring over the period, a continuation of the trend would be perceived, leading to 
optimism in the probability of airline employment and cause attrition rates to 
increase. 
• MP/AP. Military Pay to Airline Pay ratio. Prior studies hypothesized this variable 
to have a negative effect on attrition, based on the expectation that if military pay 
increases as percentage of Airline pay, attrition rates would decrease. This author, 
however, expects no effect from this variable, based on reasons articulated in 
chapter 2. 
B.        STRUCTURING RELATIONSHIPS: TIME LAG 
The collected economic data are based on the calendar year, while the retention data 
are based on the fiscal year. The statistical analyses relates a given fiscal year's attrition rate 
(dependent variable) to the preceding calendar year's economic condition (independent 
variables). By structuring the relationship in this way, the attrition is essentially lagged nine 
Source: Future Airline Professionals of America. 
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months from the hypothesized economic determinants. This structuring is both practical and 
sensible. 
If economic environmental factors influence decisions to resign, when are these effects 
observed and acted upon towards a decision? To resign, Naval officers must submit a written 
request six months in advance. Some studies have consequently used a six-month lag when 
comparing independent variables to attrition. The approach of this study assumes that it is 
unlikely that an individual, comforted by positive economic news one day, immediately 
submits a resignation letter the next day. More likely is that the undecided aviator (or perhaps 
likely-to-resign aviator in waiting) continuously monitors the economic environment. After 
a period of examining encouraging economic trends and/or convinced of a high probability 
of employment, he becomes comfortable enough to resign and subsequently chooses a date 
to submit his resignation letter. In short, the lag between favorable economic news and actual 
attrition must be at least six months, and is probably more than six months by a period which 
varies across individuals. 
This rationale led to the chosen structure of a nine month lag to compare economic 
and attrition data. Making this assumption not only makes sense, but removes problematic 
calculations converting calender year economic data to fit the fiscal year retention records. 
C.        INITIAL ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES 
As a preliminary step in the analysis, attrition rates for all groups were plotted for 
fiscal years 1978-1990 (Figures 5 and 6). When some of the variables were examined, certain 
characteristics emerged that helped identify potential explanatory variables. For example, jet 
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and propeller attrition rates were very similar to each other and higher than helicopter attrition 
rates. Particularly revealing was that the changes in attrition rates from year to year tended 
to be relatively smoothly shaped, particularly for the YOS(5-8) group (see Fig.5). This 
characteristic made an excellent case for considering the previous year's attrition rate as an 
important predictor for the current year's attrition rate. To capture this, the previous year's 
attrition rates were added to the set of independent variables. These attrition rate 
independent variables were labeled RATE(-l) for the corresponding group. 
Attrition Rates YOS (5-8) 
78        80       82        84        86        88       90 
Fiscal Year 





Attrition Rates YOS(9-12) 
78       80       82       84       86       88       90 
Fiscal Year 
Figure 6. Attrition rates, 1978-1990. 
As a second preliminary step, attrition rates were plotted against airline hiring levels 
(Figures 7 and 8) for each community. The clear similarity of curve shapes for some of the 
pilot groups suggested a stronger relationship than the correlation coefficient might indicate 
(due to the sum of the differences between the corresponding points). The relationship seen 
in Figure 5 between PROP(5-8), JET(5-8) and airline hires suggests that during upturns in 
hiring rates, attrition rates respond one year later, while downturns in hiring are met with a 
quick response in reduced attrition. This pattern suggest that a relationship may exist 
between attrition and the airline hiring rate, but the lag that should be used, contemporaneous 
or one year lag, is unclear. Attrition seems to show some relationship to HIRES at both times 
t(0) and tH). To reflect both of these time points, a new variable averaging HIRES at both t(0) 
and tH) was constructed and added to the list of potential variables, labeled 'HTRE2'. 
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78     80     82     84     86     88     90 
Fiscal Year 
Figure 7. Airline Hires vs. Attrition Rates. 








78       80 82       84       86 
Fiscal Year 
88      90 
Figure 8. Airline Hires vs. Attrition Rates. 
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D. SUMMARY 
This chapter outlines the methodology of gathering data, the measures used, 
classifying and characterizing the data and addressing time period issues. 
At this point, we have a list of eleven potential independent variables to be analyzed 
for their effects on one dependent variable, attrition, in six different community subgroups. 
The independent variables are: UNEMP (national unemployment rate), dUNEMP (change in 
national unemployment rate), PR\UN (professional unemployment rate), dPRWJN (change 
in professional unemployment rate), CILEI (composite index of leading economic indicators), 
dCILEI (change in composite index of leading economic indicators), HIRES (major airline 
hires), dHIRES (change in major airline hires), HERE2 (average of major airline hires, current 
and previous), MP/AP (military pay to airline pay ratio) and RATE(-l) (corresponding 
attrition rate from the previous year). 
The next chapter will introduce the methodology for evaluating and selecting these 
potential variables as predictors of attrition. Correlation analysis will be used to trim the list 
to a smaller set of variables to be examined in regression models. Then, candidate regression 
models incorporating various combinations of variables will be developed. Finally, the 
various regression models will be validated by testing their predictive ability. 
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IV. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
A. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter three discussed the processes by which a wide variety of potential economic 
indicator variables were chosen in an attempt to reflect an array of economic factors. In this 
chapter, the statistical analysis starts by performing Pearson Correlation tests on the variables 
to gain insight into the strength of relationships between the independent variables and pilot 
attrition, and to examine correlation between pairs of independent variables which may signal 
problems with collinearity. Next, experiments are performed fitting various OLS regression 
models to the data, to observe model and variable behavior. A later section presents statistic 
results and the candidate model selection process. Finally, the selected models undergo a 
validation process to test their effectiveness as predictive models. 
B. CORRELATION RESULTS 
1.        Independent Variables and Attrition 
To gain insight into the strength of relationship between various potential independent 
variables and the dependent attrition variables, Pearson Correlations were performed using 
the Minitab (ver. 10) statistical software package. The results in Table 4.1 are expressions 
of rvalues. 
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Helo(5-8) Jet (5-8) Prop(5-8) Helo(9-12) Jet(9-12) Prop(9-12) 
UNEMP -.762 -.813 -.857 -.468 -.740 -.360 
dUNEMP -.227 -.405 -.402 -.010 -.302 -.014 
FR\UN -.167 -.235 -.467 .273 -.277 .294 
dPR\UN -.077 .001 .018 .040 -.042 -.056 
CILEI .093 .236 .438 -.404 .310 -.438 
dCILEI -.222 -.026 -.065 -.313 -.063 -.285 
HIRES .168 .257 .475 -.185 .394 -.299 
dHIRES -.007 -.003 -.074 .131 .313 .035 
MP/AP -.284 -.185 .007 -.620 -.020 .348 
fflRE2 .184 .279 .536 -.240 .332 -.334 
RATE(-l) .719 .614 .667 .765 .703 .500 
Table 4.1 Correlation values between dependent and independent variables. 
Correlation values were examined using three criteria; magnitude, direction and 
consistency. The expected strongest relationships between independent and dependent 
variables were those with high r values, a direction of sign consistent with economic sense, 
and consistent direction of signs among the dependent variables. While r value of .3 is a 
common rule of thumb minimum threshold for significance, values as low as .275 were 
considered as possibly significant (to include as many variables as possible). 
Three levels of correlation strength of relationships between independent and 
dependent variables emerged from the analysis; "strong" (in bold in Table 4.1) meeting all of 
the criteria, "marginal" meeting some of the criteria, and "weak" which failed all criteria. The 
strongest of the explanatory variables was UNEMP (national unemployment) which had the 
highest and most consistent (negative) correlation with attrition in all six of the groups. 
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Almost as strong was the RATE(-l) variable which showed a pattern of relatively strong 
positive correlation in all six groups. Marginal explanatory variables, which met the 
significance threshold and/or had sign consistency in at least three out of six groups, were 
found to be: dUNEMP (change in national unemployment) which showed a consistently 
negative correlation to all dependent variables but low magnitude in two populations; PR\UN 
(professional unemployment), CILEI (composite index of leading economic indicators), 
HIRES (airline hires), and HIRE2 (airline hires, 2 year average). Weak explanatory variables 
were found to be: dPRMJN (change in professional unemployment) which showed near-zero 
values of correlation; dCILEI (change in the composite index of leading economic indicators), 
which also had low values and a sign direction which implies that as economic indicators 
worsen, attrition increases; dHIRES (change in airline hires), which had low correlation 
values in all but one group; and MP/AP (military pay to airline pay ratio), which had a strong 
correlation only for the HELO(9-12) group, the group seemingly least likely to react to that 
explanatory variable. 
2. Correlation Between Independent Variables 
The correlation analysis also examined the degree of correlation between independent 
variables, which impacts the subsequent regression analysis. The correlation values are 
presented in Table 4.2. The RATE(-l) variables are specified and abbreviated (e.g., the 
RATE(-l) variable corresponding to the HELO(5-8) group is labeled RH5(-1)) for 
presentation in this table. 
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-.007 .658 .300 
CILEI 
-.453 -.435 -.904 -.147 
dCILEI 
.191 -.574 -.167 -.682 .250 
HIRES 
-.564 -.508 -.919 -.144 .918 .122 
dHRES 
-.045 -.613 -.228 -.485 .244 .436 .401 
HIRE2 
-.597 -.179 -.925 -.009 .919 .000 .961 .132 
MP/AP 
-.027 -.005 -.486 .118 .738 .170 .544 .186 .533 
RH5(-n 
-.242 .016 -.002 .074 -.185 -.424 -.116 -.242 -.053 -.278 
Rj5f-n 
-.179 .072 -.162 .103 .043 -.514 .111 -.179 .174 -.130 
RPSM) 
-.282 .003 -.397 .147 .305 -.419 .296 -.282 .406 .088 
RH9f-l) 
-.400 .351 .399 .160 -.618 -.484 -.487 -.400 -.406 -.687 
RJ9M) 
-.338 .113 -.192 .042 .012 -.564 .056 -.338 .162 -.156 
RP9(-1) 
-.500 .414 .226 .183 -.434 -.602 -.395 -.500 -.276 -.359 
Table 4.2 Correlation Values Between Independent Variables 
High correlation values were found between many of the potential explanatory 
variables. Independent variables labeled previously as strong or marginal explainers of 
attrition are underlined and in bold in Table 4.2. Significant pairwise correlations (r > .3) 
between these strong and marginal explanatory variables are in bold in Table 4.2. The results 
show that high correlation exists between almost every strong and marginal explanatory 
variable except for the RATE(-l) variable in the YOS (5-8) groups. These results also signal 
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that collinearity problems may arise using combinations of these variables in linear regression 
models. 
In OLS regression, it is assumed that no linear relationship exists among the 
independent variables. When correlation between two explanatory variables is stronger than 
the correlation between an explanatory variable and the dependent variable, multi-collinearity 
exists. Ordinarily this is the result of the double counting of a causal relationship, and results 
in misspecification of the regression model. 
Multi collinearity is common and even inevitable in much of the data 
in fields like sociology, economics, and business. This is true because in these 
fields it is not generally possible to choose values for the independent 
variables; one must use the data available. In economics, as an example, data 
are virtually notorious for multi collinearity. (Wesolowsky, 1976, pg.49) 
C.        MODEL EXPERIMENTATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
In the process of selecting/evaluating the appropriate OLS regression model, several 
characteristics were desired: 
• The model should be practical in use. Decision makers should not have to perform 
unusual calculations or research numerous or obscure statistical reports to 
effectively use the model to predict attrition. 
• Variable behavior (the direction of the relationship with the dependent variable) 
should be consistent with economic "common sense". 
• The model should have a high explanatory ability (high R2). 
• The model should have low multi-collinearity. 
Based on the findings of the correlation analyses, a number of regression models were 
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constructed and fit to the data. Experimental regressions were performed using various 
combinations of the strong and marginal variables yielding interesting results. Table 4.3 
displays the typical finding from these experimental regressions and illustrates the problems 
in dealing with multi collinearity in linear regression models. The table shows what happened 
to regression R2 and t-ratios, in the JET(5-8) group, as independent variables were added (in 
decreasing order from the strongest individual univariate correlation strength). 
IVAR 2VAR 3VAR 4VAR 5VAR 6VAR 
R2 .660 .664 .729 .767 .870 .897 
UNEMP -4.62 -2.92 -3.27 -3.44 -4.82 -2.49 
RATE(-1) .26 -.33 -.20 -.61 .43 
HIRE2 -1.48 -1.71 -1.02 .09 
CILEI 1.15 2.29 2.00 
PR\UN 2.35 2.72 
dUNEMP -1.27 
Table 4.3 R2 and T-Ratios of Variable Coefficients in Models for JET(5-8). 
Though the signs of the relationships to the JET(5-8) attrition variable were as 
expected in the earlier univariate correlations, these signs changed for many of the variables 
here in the regressions, and signs were inconsistent from model to model. For example, 
PR\UN should negatively effect attrition (as indicated by its univariate correlation and 
economic sense), but in the regression, the t-ratios are positive. Another example: the 
RATE(-l) variable which had strong positive univariate correlation, showed low t-ratios and 
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inconsistent signs in the various regression models. 
Similar results were found in the other pilot groups. Perhaps this was due to the fact 
that the magnitude of correlation between the independent variables and the dependent 
(attrition) variables was relatively low (particularly in the case of aviators with YOS (9-12)), 
compared to the magnitude of correlation between the explanatory variables. 
The findings from these initial regression analyses were that no model simultaneously 
fulfilled all characteristics expressed earlier as desirable. Therefore, model candidates were 
developed based on tradeoffs in selection criteria. 
Three candidate models were developed using the following approaches: 
Aunivariate model (omitting all other variables except UNEMP) met the criteria 
for simplicity, consistency and low collinearity, but also had low explanatory 
power and large standard error. 
A simple bivariate model using UNEMP and RATE(-l) maintained simplicity, 
consistency and low collinearity, but provided a better fit (higher R2) and a lower 
standard error. 
A multivariate model, using five selected variables while omitting variables which 
were intuitively redundant or did not make economic sense was also considered. 
This model sacrificed low multi collinearity and consistency for a better fit (higher 
R2). The selected variables were those that showed the strongest pattern of 
correlation while omitting redundant variables (e.g., HIRE2 in lieu of both HIRES 
and HIRE2). 
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The relationships between the selected independent variables to pilot attrition rates 
were specified by the following candidate multivariate regression models: 
Model 1;AR, = O,0 + ß1UNEMP, +E 
Model 2; AR, = 0C0 + ß1UNEMP, + ß2RATE(-l)7 +<E 
Model 3;ARr CC0 + ß!UNEMP, + ß2dUNEMP, + ß3CILEI/ + ß4HmE2,. + 
ß5RATE(-l)7+6 
were AR is the attrition rate for group i, a is the intercept term, the ß terms are the 
coefficients of the selected variables in the equation to be estimated and e represents the error 
term. Separate OLS models were estimated for the six pilot populations. 
D.       CANDIDATE MODEL STATISTICAL RESULTS 
The OLS results are summarized in Tables 4.4 through 4.9 below. 
Model 1 '.-Mni1ftl2 Model -5 
Variable Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio 
Constant 22.872 8.81 14.832 6.05 29.419 11.02 
UNEMP -2.149 -3.90 -1.434 -2.05 -3.553 -1.741 
dUNEMP .785 .66 
CILEI .05307 .55 
HTRE2 
-.00115 -1.05 
RATE(-l) .394 1.53 -.11194 -.20 
R2 .580 .660 .718 
Table 4.4 Helicopter Pilots with 5 to 8 YOS. 
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ModPl 1 MnHpl 2 Mnd*13 
Variable Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio 
Constant 60.945 10.55 56.328 9.353 59.784 10.06 
ÜNEMP -5.665 -4.623 -5.254 -2.91 -8.764 -2.41 
düNEMP .9058 .32 
CILEI .2430 1.11 
HIRE2 
-.0034 -1.57 
RATE(-l) .0844 .324 -.1365 -.35 
R2 .660 .664 .771 
Table 4.5 Jet Pilots with 5 to 8 YOS. 
Mndel 1 Mnri«l'2 Mniid'3 
Variable Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio 
Constant 59.037 13.46 61.012 13.28 58.687 11.13 
UNEMP -5.132 -5.51 -5.3018 -3.30 -6.637 -1.67 
dUNEMP 1.184 .39 




-.0353 -.13 -.190 -.38 
R2 .734 .734 .746 
Table 4.6 Propeller Pilots with 5 to 8 YOS. 
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MndoM Mndri 7. Mnd*l 3 
Variable Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio 
Constant 6.125 5.58 .765 .92 10.217 12.38 





HIRE2 .000 .07 
RATE(-l) .262 2.99 .109 .637 
R2 .219 .588 .719 
Table 4.7 Helo Pilots with 9 to 12 YOS. 
Mndel 1 Model 2 Mndd 3 
Variable Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio 
Constant 19.063 8.59 12.416 5.77 1.466 .62 







RATE(-l) .122 1.31 .148 .98 
R2 .546 .613 .681 
  
Table 4.8 Jet Pilots with 9 to 12 YOS. 
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Mortal 1 MnHol 2 MnHrf 3 
Variable Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio 
Constant 10.524 4.97 2.008 .98 10.205 7.30 





BDDRE2 .000 .235 
RATE(-l) .152 1.28 .267 .13 
R2 .130 .253 .759 
Table 4.9 Propeller Pilots with 9 to 12 YOS. 
In all six pilot populations, better fits (higher R2) were found in models as the number 
of variables increased. A higher R2, however, does not necessarily translate to better 
predictive performance. The next section tests the predictive ability of the candidate models. 
E.        MODEL VALIDATION 
Cross checks of the candidate models were performed to evaluate their validity. To 
do this, hold-out data was omitted for each year (1978 through 1990) while regression model 
parameters were estimated on the remaining data. The resulting estimated models were then 
applied to the hold-out data to predict attrition rates for each hold-out year. The process was 
repeated throughout the data set. The predicted attrition rates for each year were compared 
to actual attrition rates, and errors (in terms of percent of actual attrition rate) were 
calculated. The error mean, the error median, the standard deviation of errors, minimum error 
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and maximum error were evaluated.  Tables 4.10 through 4.12 contain the error statistics 
from predictions based on the three regression models. 
Group Mean Median Std. Dev. Max. Err Min. Err 
HELO(5-8) 2.258 2.358 1.494 4.592 .014 
PROP(5-8) 4.956 3.965 3.400 12.983 .917 
JET(5-8) 3.750 3.691 2.614 9.935 .210 
HELO(9-12) .971 .892 .620 2.012 .143 
JET(9-12) 2.278 2.330 .882 3.558 .870 
PROP(9-12) 1.738 1.474 1.413 5.007 .023 
Table 4.10 Attrition Rate Error Statistics from Regression Model 1. 
Group Mean Median Std. Dev. Max. Err Min. Err 
HELO(5-8) 2.149 2.054 1.551 4.745 .038 
PROP(S-8) 5.313 4.473 3.626 14.337 .325 
JET(5-8) 4.157 3.841 2.928 9.947 .101 
HELO(9-12) .787 .551 .445 1.547 .149 
JET(9-12) 2.252 2.210 .824 3.498 .858 
PROP(9-12) 1.632 .651 1.525 4.746 .095 
Table 4.11 Attrition Rate Error Statistics from Regression Model 2. 
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Grouj^ Mean Median Std.Dev. Max. Err Min. Err 
HELO(5-8) 2.679 1.957 2.554 7.295 0.013 
PROP(5-8) 7.243 5.772 3.792 13.573 2.792 
JET(5-8) 5.935 4.751 4.121 13.060 0.009 
HELO(9-12) 1.058 1.023 .369 2.091 .647 
JET(9-12) 2.776 2.966 1.528 6.334 .284 
PROP(9-12) 1.525 1.657 .925 2.956 .218 
Table 4.12 Attrition Rate Error Statistics from Regression Model 3. 
Additionally, prediction errors from the models were compared to a "naive 
prediction". This was done to see if the regression predictions could outperform a simple 
naive approach, which was defined as last year's attrition. In other words, if a prediction 
were based simply on one equal to the previous year's attrition rate for each pilot group, how 
would this compare to the candidate regression model predictions? Table 4.13 contains 
analogous error statistics for the naive predictions. Numbers in bold represent the winning 
(lowest error) measure between all four models. 
47 
Group Mean Median Std. Dev. Max. Err Min. Err 
HELO(5-8) 1.991 0.878 1.937 5.865 .304 
PROP(5-8) 6.480 4.401 4.931 18.433 .723 
JET(5-8) 5.347 4.276 3.865 14.131 1.019 
HELO(9-12) .861 .682 .698 2.574 .000 
JET(9-12) 2.650 2.757 2.045 6.384 .005 
PROP(9-12) 1.954 1.575 1.434 4.703 0.481 
Table 4.13 Attrition Rate Error Statistics Using Naive Predictions. 
Ultimately, the goal of this procedure was to find the model which made the best 
prediction. "Best" may be defined differently, depending upon the user. Some users may 
want a model which yields the lowest maximum error, while others may prefer the lowest 
median or mean error. Regardless of criteria preference, some models were clear winners 
over others. Model 1 had the most (11 out of 30) lowest errors, followed by Model 2 (with 
9 out of 30). Model 3 and the naive approach produced less winners (6 and 4 respectively). 
Some pilot group attrition rates were clearly predicted better by some models over 
others. Model 1 best predicted attrition rates for the JET(5-8) and PROP(5-8) groups. 
Model 2 best predicted attrition rates for the HELO(9-12) and JET(9-12) groups. The best 
model for predicting attrition rates for the PROP(9-12) group could be argued between 
Model 2 or Model 3. The best model for predicting attrition rates for the HELO(5-8) group 
is also unclear, with Model 1 having the lowest standard deviation of error and lowest 
maximum error, while the naive approach had a lower mean and median of error. 
48 
It should be noted that even though certain regression models could outperform the 
naive approach for the three pilot populations with nine to twelve years of service, the 
improvement was marginal. The same could be said about the HELO(5-8) group, where 
variation in attrition rates is relatively low. However, in the two populations which 
experience the highest levels and variation in attrition rates, the simple univariate model 
predicted rates with significantly less error than the naive approach. 
Further discussion of these results, conclusions and recommendations are presented 
in the next chapter. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis investigated the ability to predict naval aviator attrition using linear 
regression models with economic data as predictors. It examined economic and attrition data 
from 1978 to 1990. The analysis found that in most groups, simple regression models 
outperformed naive predictions based on the prevailing retention rates. The results did not 
provide conclusive findings about the economic environmental determinants of pilot attrition. 
A.        SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
1. Predictive Model Performance 
Three regression models were constructed. Individual models proved to be effective 
in predicting attrition for five out of the six pilot groups. The findings of model performance 
are summarized below: 
• No single model is best for all groups 
• Attrition rates for YOS(5-8) and YOS(9-12) groups are substantially different, and 
the models that best predict attrition for these two different YOS periods are also 
different. Model 1 tends to be best for YOS(5-8), (except for HELO). Model 2 
tends to be best for YOS(9-12). 
• A simple, univariate regression model (Model 1), using the national unemployment 
rate as a predictor, was the most effective of the models tested in predicting 
attrition rates for jet and propeller pilots with five to eight years of service. 
• A simple, 2-variable regression model( Model 2), using the national unemployment 
rate and the previous year's attrition rate as predictors, was the most effective of 
the models tested in predicting attrition rates for helicopter and jet pilots with nine 
to twelve years of service. 
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• A multi variate regression model (Model 3), using the national unemployment rate, 
change in the rate, composite index of leading economic indicators, airline hiring 
rate (2 year average) and previous year's attrition rate as predictors, could be 
argued to be effective in predicting the attrition rate for only the propeller pilots 
with nine to twelve years of service, but was overall the least effective of the three 
models. 
• Significant improvement over a naive prediction is achieved only for the PROP(5- 
8) and JET(5-8) groups. Fortunately, these are the groups where you would 
expect and hope for the best results because: (1) attrition is highest and most 
variable in the YOS(5-8) period and thus a predictive model is most useful here, 
and, (2) propeller and jet groups are most likely to respond to what is happening 
in the commercial market place. 
2.        Explanatory Variables 
A high degree of multicollinearity in the multiple regressions prevented meaningful 
evaluations and tests of significance of many of the explanatory variables. Extracting causal 
determinants of attrition using the methodology of this study proved ineffective, given that 
many of the economic variables changed in consort. Still, this investigation revealed a degree 
of understanding into the effects of these economic variables on aviator attrition. These 
limited findings are listed below: 
The national unemployment rate, as hypothesized, negatively affected attrition 
rates. This variable was the strongest and most consistent predictor of pilot 
attrition in almost every regression model. 
Change in national unemployment, as hypothesized, negatively affected attrition 
rates. This was the only "trend" variable which showed any significance as a 
predictor. 
The professional unemployment rate, as hypothesized, negatively affected attrition 
rates, but to a lesser degree than national unemployment. Perhaps this is due to 
the fact that this statistic is not well publicized. 
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• Change in professional unemployment did not demonstrate an effect on attrition 
rates. 
• The Composite Index of (twelve) Leading Economic Indicators had an 
inconclusive effect on attrition rates. 
• Change in Composite Index of (twelve) Leading Economic Indicators did not 
demonstrate an effect on attrition rates. A very low, but consistently negative 
correlation was found which was contrary to its hypothesized effects. 
• Airline hiring rates had an inconclusive effect on attrition rates. This finding 
contradicted the hypothesized effects, the observations in other studies and the 
personal experience-based perceptions of this researcher. This finding may 
indicate weaknesses in the study. 
• Changes in airline hiring did not demonstrate an effect on attrition rates. 
• Military pay to airline pay ratio did not demonstrate an effect on attrition rates, 
which was an expected result. 
• Previous attrition rates were found to be significant predictor variables. 
B.        METHODOLOGY EVALUATION 
One of the assumptions of this study was that when cohort pilot attrition rates are 
aggregated, individual attrition determinants are averaged out, and the populations are 
somewhat homogeneous from year to year. This may not be the case, and could explain why 
evaluating individual predictors was difficult. For example, if for one or two years there were 
great employment opportunities for engineers, and those inclined to seek that line of work 
responded by resigning, then the population in the following year has changed (depleted of 
engineers) and the new population may not respond to similar signals of opportunity. The 
same might be said for other professions (including the airline industry) which may attract 
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naval aviators. 
Given that economic measures used as variables are notorious for collinearity, then 
perhaps linear regression is not the best approach for predicting attrition. Perhaps a more 
sophisticated approach which starts with the prevailing attrition rate and then applies a vector 
based on combined economic and policy measures would perform better than the models 
developed in this study. 
The methodology used in this study to capture the proper time lag between economic 
events and attrition rate responses is rather crude. Additionally, other significant economic 
measures may exist which were not addressed in this study. 
Despite the potential weaknesses in the approach of this study, effective predictive 
models still emerged. This may indicate that economic environmental factors, as hypothesized 
in Chapter I, are largely responsible for the changes in attrition and could be better 
understood with further study. 
C.        RECOMMENDATIONS 
Future research could continue by adding more recent data to the file, which will 
enable the models to be further refined. Data sources could be developed to allow analysis 
of pilot attrition on a monthly basis, to refine and develop models, and to study the effects of 
different time lags between independent and dependent variables. 
A critical manpower function is to monitor and correctly interpret trends in naval 
aviator retention. This analysis helps provide manpower planners with a force-shaping tool 
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AGGREGATED COHORT AVIATOR ATTRITION RATE DATA 
FY HELO(5-8) JET(5-8) PROP(5-8) HELO(9-12) JET(9-12) PROP(9-12 
1978 12.92 35.53 30.76 4.90 8.98 6.95 
1979 13.75 34.81 31.78 5.58 12.47 11.65 
1980 11.55 26.92 27.50 4.64 8.76 9.52 
1981 9.36 19.03 23.23 3.70 5.05 7.39 
1982 4.01 16.62 15.47 3.28 5.75 6.90 
1983 4.33 12.22 13.58 2.74 5.11 6.07 
1984 4.64 7.82 11.69 2.20 4.48 5.24 
1985 3.89 16.67 18.45 2.14 4.47 4.54 
1986 6.08 13.29 21.04 3.21 5.90 5.81 
1987 5.20 22.52 28.19 2.17 4.79 3.10 
1988 11.06 34.32 38.10 2.17 11.18 7.80 
1989 11.70 30.73 31.53 2.75 8.42 6.22 
1990 12.01 29.46 30.22 4.57 13.31 5.54 
Source: (Turner, 1995) 
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